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Law can be the site through which women‟s dignity and equality can be expressed and pursued.  
Speaking the language of rights translates one‟s needs from private interests to public claims 
through words and concepts that the community – local, national and/or international – have 
already validated.  Law can therefore offer a medium to confront the injustices and unfairness 
built into other systems of political, social and economic ordering. Women‟s rights advocates 
have won significant victories through law and have generated gains for women‟s dignity and 
equality.   
 
However, law can also be a place where women‟s rights are not only silenced but where social, 
economic and political power structures are replicated and work against women‟s rights. Rule of 
law programming focused on women‟s rights and democratic governance must therefore begin 
with a clear definition of the rule of law, a careful analysis of the causes of women‟s inequality 
and the context in which it is perpetuated and sustained, coupled with an ability and desire to 
harness law as an instrument of social change that is tempered by a sober understanding that law 
is unpredictable and complex in its results.    
 
This paper proceeds in several parts.  First, it identifies the key issues relating to women‟s 
democratic governance, women‟s rights and the rule of law.  While scholars and advocates have 
advanced theorizing and use of law in support of women‟s needs and interests, much 
conceptualization, implementation and assessment or evaluation work remains to be done.   
 
The second part identifies the importance of normativity and power relations for feminist 
theorizing.  Feminist conceptions of the rule of law recognize that law is shot throughout with 
social and economic power and that harnessing women‟s emancipation to law is fraught with 
uncertainties and complications.  Social, political and economic inequality inevitably replicate 
themselves as substantive, procedural and social barriers to access to justice.  At the same time, 
feminist theorizing around the rule of law also recognizes the importance of using law to speak 
truth to power and to gain access to the sites in which social relations are defined and 
consolidated.  Feminists increasingly recognize the value of using law to promote women‟s 
dignity but remain uncertain about how to judge the result of their efforts.   
 
The final sections of this paper discuss the different barriers to access to justice that face elite 
and marginalized women, the possible roles that NGOs can play in the realization of women‟s 
rights, and the potential for mutually interdependent and reinforcing roles that women in various 
positions of power can play in promoting women‟s rights more generally.  These considerations 
prove important to devising access to justice strategies in a particular case and to strategizing 
around long term policy development because they illustrate the institutional and social barriers 




This paper uses the research questions advanced by IDRC as the main intellectual frame.  
Because the wide range of issues and the vast geographic scope under consideration, it was not 
possible to undertake or provide a comprehensive literature review or annotated bibliography.  
The research was nonetheless comprehensive in the sense that all legal private and public 
databases (e.g. JSTOR, Lexis, Westlaw, Women‟s Human Rights Resources, Google Scholar) 
were reviewed with an eye to responding to the questions posed and identifying appropriate case 
studies to illustrate the various points made.  In addition, Internet searches were conducted to 
identify NGO‟s working in the rule of law area around the globe to determine the type of work in 
which they were engaged and to identify and analyze reports of their activities.  Case studies 
were selected with the intent of canvassing as wide a geographic range as possible and having 
regard for the extensiveness of the analysis offered.  I also drew on my own experiences with 
rule of law programming in Palestine over the last 10 years and my experience of teaching an 
access to justice course for the last 7 years with the benefit of input from colleagues at the 
University of Windsor.  Where citations are provided, I sought to provide at least one reference 
to open-access Internet based resources over sources available on commercial databases because 
open-access resources, while not fully accessible to all, at least have the virtue of being more 
accessible than commercial counterparts while the commercial sources tend to be more 
comprehensive. 
 
The methodological limits to this study and studies involving women‟s access to justice around 
the globe include: 
A. Access to information - women's experiences are often not documented in written form; 
this research is being conducted exclusively in English but women‟s experiences to the 
extent they are documented may be available in other languages, not English.   
B. Conceptual Problems - the basic concepts such as "rule of law" and "women" are not 
always clear or coherent; this leads to assumptions which may ultimately paper over 
some important questions that require careful and sustained analysis 
C. Geography - it is impossible to generalize across women's experiences; case studies are 
used to illustrate but caution must be had in drawing general lessons from specific studies 
D. Context is key – it is impossible to generalize about women‟s human rights strategies or 
the relationship of rule of law initiatives for governance.  
 
Legal strategies sometimes work to promote women‟s rights and sometimes they do not.  Recent 
experiences have determined that successful legal strategies must be planned and implemented 
with a knowledge of a particular social context not only because legal norms, precedents and 
strategies are culturally or locally defined but because successful legal strategies generally exist 
alongside successful social mobilization and education strategies which can only be carried out 




Democratic development entails not only a system of governance defined by "one person, one 
vote" but also implies that those living within a particular jurisdiction should be treated as beings 
worthy of equal respect and dignity.  Law is not only an instrument of governance but also a 
means through which individuals and groups seek affirmation of their right to live with dignity 
and respect.  Women's rights to democratic development therefore imply the right to equal 
benefit and protection of the law.
 1
  In jurisdictions around the world, formally democratic or not, 
women's rights are violated.  Women disproportionately suffer from poverty, they are denied the 
right to participate in the civil and political life of their nation on equal terms with men, they 
suffer in gendered ways during times of war, they face violence at home and inequality in the 
workplace.  Such violations both highlight women's inequality and prevent them from pursuing a 
life defined by dignity and equality.
2
  Not surprisingly, women's rights scholars, policy-makers 
and activists are increasingly turning to the law as one site in which women's rights can be 
realized.   
 
Law can be a site through which women‟s dignity and equality can be expressed and pursued.  
Speaking the language of rights translates one‟s needs from private interests to public claims 
through words and concepts that a community – local, national and/or international – has already 
validated.
3
  Law can therefore offer a medium to confront the injustices and unfairness built into 
other systems of political, social and economic ordering.
4
 Women‟s rights advocates have won 
some significant victories through law and have generated gains for women‟s dignity and 
equality.
5
 However, law can also be a place where women‟s rights are not only silenced but 
where social, economic and political power structures are replicated and work against women‟s 
rights.
6
   
                                                          
1
 Without this normative dimension, the quest for democracy and the emphasis on rule of law risks new global 
hegemonies.  Avtar Brah and Ann Phoenix, “Ain‟t I A Woman? Revisiting Intersectionality” (2004) 5(3) Journal of 
International Women‟s Studies 83 available online: <http://www.bridgew.edu/Soas/jiws/May04/Phoenix_Brah.pdf>.  
2
 See for example the Concluding Observations issued by CEDAW in response to various country reports filed 
under the Women‟s Convention available online:  <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/>. 
3
 Legal theoreticians often articulate rights claims as the public demand for recognition as a person of equal dignity.  
Rights claims convert private experiences of pain, tragedy and trauma into public narratives that demand respect, 
recognition, explanation and accounting. As Lynn Freedman puts it, rights claims are both declarative and 
constitutive of “the right to be seen, to be heard, to be listened to”  "Human Rights and Women's Health" in Marlene 
Goldman and Maureen Hatch, eds., Women and Health (New York:  Academic Press, 2000) 428 at 434).  In the 
same vein, Patricia Williams contends that invoking the language of rights “elevates one‟s status from human body 
to social being” The Alchemy of Race and Rights:  Diary of a Law Professor (Cambridge:  Harvard University 
Press) at 153. 
4
For example, critics charge that the Millennium Development Goals justify trade-offs between economic 
development and gender equality and suggests how international human rights norms can be harnessed to alternative 
approaches for poverty reduction.  See Christina Holder, “A Feminist Human Rights Approach for Engendering the 
Millennium Development Goals” (2007) 14 Cardozo J.L.& Gender 125.   
5
 See for example the discussion in Amira Mashhour, “Islamic Law and Gender Equality - Could There Be a 
Common Ground: A Study of Divorce and Polygamy in Sharia Law and Contemporary Legislation in Tunisia and 
Egypt” (2005) 27 Hum. Rts. Q. 562. 
6
 Catherine McKinnon, for example, questions why the world has not mobilized against violence against women in 
the way that it has mobilized against the September 11 terrorist attacks though a “war” against women has been 
waged across the globe for decades.  See “Women‟s September 11: Re-thinking the International Law of Conflict” 
(2006) 47(1) Harv. Int‟l L.J. 1.  Also see the discussion of how freedom of conscience has been used to bolster 
6 
 
Democracy promotion can also produce negative results for vulnerable and marginalized groups, 
women included.  At least some experts contend, for example, that the campaign for 
democratization in Iraq has coincided with the drastic demise of women‟s well-being.
7
  Current 
analysis of legal reforms and democratization in the Middle East more generally suggests that 
legal reforms, taken on their own, have not generated positive political change.  Others caution 
that the relationship between democratization and legal reform has proven troubled and 
generated suffering in Latin America.
8
  Part of the problem arises when reformers equate 
democratization with legal reform and believe that legal reforms drive democratization.  Even 
more worrying than the tendency on the part of reformers and policy-makers to equate legal 
reforms and democratization is the willingness to harness democracy to justify violating rights of 
those who are deemed to live in less democratic regimes.
9
     
 
Rule of law programming focused on women‟s rights and democratic governance must therefore 
begin with a clear definition of the rule of law – a definition which recognizes and is fully 
committed to the human rights of all people living within a given jurisdiction – and a careful 
analysis of the causes of women‟s inequality and the context in which it is perpetuated and 
sustained.  Rule of law programming focused on women‟s rights and democratic governance 
must also build alliances with a range of individuals and institutions that have an ability and 
desire to harness law as an instrument of social change.
10
  Rule of law programming must also be 
tempered by a sober understanding that law is unpredictable and complex in its workings.    
 
This paper proceeds in several parts.  First, it identifies the key issues relating to women‟s 
democratic governance, women‟s rights and the rule of law.  The second part identifies the 
importance of normativity and power relations for feminist theorizing around the rule of law.  
Feminist conceptions of the rule of law recognize that law is shot throughout with social and 
economic power and that harnessing women‟s emancipation to law is fraught with uncertainties 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
religious laws in some Indian communities that undermine women‟s rights. Archana Parashar, Women and Family 
Law Reform in India:  Uniform Civil Code and Gender Equality (New Delhi:  Sage Publications, 1992).  
7
 See for example, Natalie Tovmasyan Riegg,  who discusses the problems of women‟s liberation and the 
implication of Western feminism in the politics of oppression: “In other words, it looks as though, in today‟s 
feminism , the problem of Woman as Other is being increasingly complemented by the problem of the Other 
Woman.” emphasis in original. “The Theory and Practice of Promoting Democratization: Women‟s Issues” (Paper 
presented to the International Studies Association Southern Region Annual Conference, Miami, 3 November 2005), 
online: <http://www.isa-south.org/2005%20Miami%20Papers_files/D4_Natalie_Riegg.pdf> at 16. 
8
 Julio Faundez, “Democratization Through Law:  Perspectives From Latin America,”   
Democratization (2005) 12(1) 749. 
9
 There is a long standing tradition in law to the effect that less civilized people or nations are not entitled to or 
worthy of the equal benefit and equal protection of law.  See for example, Elbridge Colby, “How to Fight Savage 
Tribes” (1927) A.J.I.L. 21(2) 279 and the discussions offered in Antony Anghie‟s concern “with understanding the 
strategies by which international law rewrites its history, in different phases, and, in particular, how it seeks to 
suppress the colonial foundations of the discipline:” “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in 
Nineteenth-Century International Law” (1999) 40 Harv. Int‟l L.J. 1 at 8;  See also Antony Anghie, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Frédéric Mégret, 
“From „Savages‟ to „Unlawful Combatants‟: A Post-Colonial Look at International Humanitarian Law's „Other,' ” in 
Anne Orford, ed., International Law and its “Others” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Mark 
Mazower, An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the Mid-Twentieth Century 
(2006) International Affairs 82(3) 553 
10




and complications.  At the same time, feminist theorizing around the rule of law also recognizes 
the importance of using law to speak truth to power and to gain access to the sites in which social 
relations are defined, evaluated and consolidated.  The final sections of this paper discuss the 
different barriers to access to justice that face elite and marginalized women, the possible roles 
that NGOs can play in the realization of women‟s rights, and the possible mutually 
interdependent and reinforcing roles that women in various positions of power can play in 
promoting women‟s rights more generally.  The very last section sets out areas for further 
research and analysis.  While scholars and advocates have significantly advanced the thinking 
about and harnessing of law in support of women‟s needs and interests, much conceptualization, 
implementation and assessment or evaluation work remains to be done.   
2. Feminist Conceptions of the Rule of Law 
While "rule of law" rhetoric has flourished in policy circles,
11
 it is important to be clear about the 
meaning of the rule of law being employed in any given context because insistence on "the rule 
of law" can have potentially disastrous outcomes for equality seekers.
12
  At its core, the “rule of 
law” stands in opposition to arbitrary and biased decision-making. Beyond this core 
understanding, there is little agreement about the meaning or value of rule of law agendas.
13
  
Indeed, "rule of law" agendas have historically been advanced to justify imperialism and 
colonialism and "rule of law" discourse continues to have negative consequences for women 
across the globe.
14
  The problem has several dimensions.  First, positivistic conceptions of the 
"rule of law" promote respect for the law regardless of its normative content, on the claim that 
the laws in question are the product of a legitimate process of rule making (generally but not 
always a democratic process).
15
  Such an approach emphasizes enforcement of laws on the books 
and can prove consistent with the tyranny of the majority (or those who are otherwise politically 
powerful).  It purportedly aims at economic, social or political stability but not necessarily social 
justice, in part because it sidelines or silences the voices and interests of a segment of the 
population, particularly those who are politically, socially or economically marginalized.  One 
can point to rule of law reforms in Palestine as an example.
16
  
                                                          
11
 For a critical overview, see Thomas Carothers, “Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge” 
(2003) Carnegie Rule of Law Series:  Democracy and Rule of Law Project, 34 online: 
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp34.pdf>. 
12
The best introduction to different conceptions of the rule of law and the importance of these conceptions for legal 
decision-making remains the fictional set of decisions in Lon Fuller “The Case of the Speluncean Explorers” (1949) 
62(4) Harv.L. Rev. 616 and “The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Contemporary Proceedings” (1993) 61 Geo. 
Wash. L.R. 1754.  For a more extensive and grounded discussion, see Brian Z. Tamanaha On the Rule of Law: 
History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
13
 See for example, Richard H. Fallon, “„The Rule of Law‟ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse” (1997) 97(1) 
Colum. L. Rev. 1  
14
 See for example Fionnuala Ni Aolain and Michael Hamilton, “Gender and the Rule of Law in Transitional 
Societies” (2009) 18(2) Minn. J. Int'l L. 380.  
15
 See the brief discussion in “Rule of Law as a Goal of Development Policy” World Bank, Law and Justice 
Institutions, online: 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,contentMDK:20763583~menu
PK:1989584~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:1974062~isCURL:Y,00.html>;    For a broader discussion 
see Tamanaha, supra note 11.   
16
 Mudar Kassis, "Rule of Law Without Freedom! The Case of Palestine" Paper presented at the annual meeting of 




Other conceptions of the rule of law pay attention to the normative dimensions and implications 
of law-making and enforcement.  Rule of law agendas, within this framework, are to be 
promoted and respected not simply because they are the product of a particular formal process 
but because they aim towards a particular valued result such as the equal dignity and worth of all 
peoples.  Such an approach is more feminist in its orientation because it explicitly and clearly 
aligns itself with just outcomes.
17
 While feminists disagree about the nature and scope of the 
feminist project, they do tend to agree that the rule of law, broadly understood, commits 
feminists to not only ask “the woman question” but to approach law with an understanding that it 
is not a neutral medium but one that reflects forms of power.
18
  In particular, feminist legal 
theorists and reformers pay attention to:  
 
 Gaining an understanding of women‟s lived realities and needs through sustained 
consultation  
 Carefully defining the normative elements which must be embodied by and promoted 
through the law (e.g. equality, dignity, autonomy, physical integrity) 
 Adopting a progressive interpretive strategy of a given legal text that is consciously 
harnessed to respond to women‟s defined needs 
 Remaining attentive to the impact of law and law reform on women‟s lives 
 Remaining cognizant of the power relations within the law 
 Always being aware of the intersection of gender with other constructs of identity such as 




 Ensuring commitment to carefully analyzing legal strategies but also aware of the need to 
de-center law and use multiple strategies 
 
This core understanding of the rule of law from a feminist perspective arose largely in response 
to conceptions of the rule of law which focused on ensuring that laws were created according to 
a legitimate process.  Feminists ask not only about the process which gives rise to law but also 
adopt a critical stance in relation to law, always cognizant of whose interests are reflected in law.   
 
Beyond these core points, however, feminist conceptions of and experiences with law remains 
highly contested.  Of course, the above leaves open important questions such as, “what 
normative values should be adopted and advanced as part of any understanding of the rule of 
law? Are these values universal and to what extent, if at all, do they have specific cultural 
content?”
20
  For example, is the concept of human dignity a universal value that can be accepted 
                                                          
17
 Some who adopt such an approach to the rule of law prefer the phrase "access to justice" primarily because the 
word "access" implies the right to make a claim before a decision-maker while the word "justice" implies the need to 
address whether the norms which are being used in judgment are themselves fair.  It should be noted and I am 
mindful of the fact that there is no single conception of "feminism" and that different feminists might line up 
differently in relation to different conceptions of the rule of law as well as specific legal reforms. 
18
 See Chapter 1 in Martha Chamallas, Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory, 2d ed., (New York:  Aspen 
Publishers, 2003)  
19
 Hilary Charlesworth “Whose Rule? Women and the International Rule of Law” in Spencer Zifcak ed., 
Globalization and the Rule of Law (London: Routledge, 2005) 83 
20
 This question is raised, for example, when states invoke Islamic Shar‟ia to reserve against international human 




across cultures and histories?
21
  If so, does human dignity tolerate different content in different 
contexts?  If it tolerates different content across contexts, does it nonetheless have a minimum 
core set of requirements that are the same across contexts and cultures?
22
  These questions prove 
highly contentious within feminist literature and will be discussed in further detail below.  
Nonetheless, while feminists might disagree about the precise content of legal rules and the 
strategies needed to achieve dignity and equality, they do agree on the need to be aware of law‟s 
hegemonic potential. 
3. Beyond Apology and Utopia: Litigation, Law Reform and Social Change 
Feminists have become particularly interested in whether law reform can have the impact 
promised by legal reformers and hoped for by rights claimants.
23
  This is a complicated question 
that evokes various responses from experts, often depending on their particular social and activist 
orientation and/or legal philosophy.
24
 Initially, women‟s rights scholarship focused rather 
uncritically on the means and methods needed to achieve a particular end:  the scholarship was 
largely doctrinal in nature and concerned itself predominantly with legal texts and legal 
interpretations.  Inspired by Critical Legal Studies (CLS), skeptics began to challenge law‟s 
ability to facilitate social change.  CLS holds that the “rule of law” is a myth used to hide power 
within the law.  Law is inherently unstable, according to this argument, and cannot be the site of 
social change.   
 
Skepticism has also been fuelled by empirical case studies.   Perhaps the best known study of the 
relationship between legal reform and social change focused on school segregation in the United 
States following the US Supreme Court's order to de-segregate schools.
25
 Seeking to change 
society exclusively through legal reform was declared a “hollow hope.”
26
  Critics noted that 
schools in fact became more segregated after the famous Brown v. Board of Education decision 
in which the Supreme Court of the United States ordered the de-segregation of schools.
27
  
Reviewing women‟s rights campaigns in areas such as rape and pornography, Carol Smart 
                                                          
21
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The Arab Charter on Human Rights and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights, for example, all give primacy to human dignity in their preambles.   
22
Darren Rosenblum, “Internalizing Gender:  Why International Law Theory Should Adopt Comparative Methods” 
(2007) 45 Colum.J. Transnat‟l L. 759. 
23
 See generally Michael McCann, ed.,  Law and Social Movements (London: Ashgate, 2008) 
24
William Bogart has helpfully divided the literature into several models of the relationship between law and social 
change.  William Bogart, Consequences:  The Impact of Law and Its Complexities (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2002). 
25
 Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 2d ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008) 
26
 Perhaps those outside of law were not surprised by this declaration.  However, lawyers themselves had become 
largely insular and often failed – and continue to fail – to adopt multi-disciplinary knowledge or have regard for 
social science or social context in developing their legal strategies.  See Rosenberg, ibid. 
27
 For an overview of the skeptical arguments about de-segregation, see Amy Stuart Wells, Awo Korantemaa Atanda, 
Jennifer Jellison Holme, Amina Humphrey, and Anita Revilla, “In Search of Brown:  The Unfulfilled Promise of 
School Desegregation in Six Racially Mixed High Schools” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Sociological Association, Atlanta, 16 August 2003) online: 





concluded in Feminism and the Power of Law that rights discourse “has become more of a power 




Some argue that law, because it is created, interpreted and enforced by those with interests in 
maintaining the status quo will only ever produce limited change.
29
  In other words, it serves 
more of a disciplining function than an emancipatory one.  In the end, law co-opts reformers and 
delegates women‟s rights to a secondary status.  Analysts, for example, charge that the local 
Gacaca courts established in Rwanda to counter the access to justice problems associated with 
national and international tribunals remove women‟s abuses from this form of community based 
justice because the courts originally did not handle cases involving sexual violence.
30
  Others 
question whether the more formal courts and tribunals created to promote transitional justice re-
traumatize women because the individual gets lost in the larger quest to remain true to 
evidentiary principles or establish precedents.
31
  A third group of observers note that once 
disputes are transformed into legal questions, they become inaccessible to even the people 
involved the disputes and their supporters because of the legal jargon  and procedures invoked by 
lawyers and because direct action strategies are often discouraged by legal elites who are often 




 Still others question the capacity of legal reforms to change political decision-making.  
Feminists debate whether pursuing legal agendas represents the best strategy for advancing 
women's rights.
33
 “Rights-talk” has the capacity to distort women‟s experiences by forcing them 
into preconceived categories of meaning, puts decision-making into a system which does not 
fully understand or acknowledge its own power dynamics, and deflects valuable resources away 
from other strategies such as political mobilization and lobbying.  Rights-talk, according to 
some, also dilutes our ability to conceive of an altogether different world order because “to the 
extent that people are 'afflicted' by legal thinking . . . counterhegemonic thought will simply 
make less sense, simply be harder to think"
34
   
 
                                                          
28
 (London, Routledge, 1989) at 3. 
29
 See for example Margareth Etienne, “Addressing Gender-Based Violence in an International Context” (1995) 18 
Harv. Women‟s L.J.139 (arguing that the normative framework of international women‟s human rights limits its 
potential) and Alice Edwards, “Violence Against Women as Sex Discrimination:  Judging the Jurisprudence of the 
United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies” (2008) 18 Tex. J. Women & L. 1 arguing that forcing violence against 
women into sex discrimination norms fractures women‟s experiences and leads to uneven decision-making. 
30
 Sarah L. Wells, “Gender, Sexual Violence and Prospects for Justice at the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda” (2004/05)  
47 S. Cal Rev. L. & Women‟s Stud. 167. For a brief discussion, see Anne Marie Goetz et al. Who Answers to 
Women?” Progress of the World’s Women 2008-2009, Chapter 5, Justice (UNIFEM, 2009) online: 
<http://www.unifem.org/progress/2008/justiceFS_box5b.html>. 
31
 Katherine Franke, “Gendered Subjects of Transnational Justice” (2006) 15(3) Colum. J. Gender & L. 813 (she 
suggests mechanisms that prove respectful of testimony as individual suffering but unfortunately does not deal with 
the fact that the testimony is also evidence that is to be tested for its veracity in what largely remains an adversarial 
system). 
32
See the discussion in Austin Sarat and Stuart A. Scheingold eds., Cause Lawyers and Social Movements (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2006) 
33
 For an overview of the debate, see Reem Bahdi, "Analyzing Women's Use of the Internet through the Rights 
Debate", (2000) 75(3) Chicago-Kent L.Rev.869. 
34
 Francesca Polletta “The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961-
1966” (2000) 34(2) Law & Sociology Rev. 367 (citing Kelman) at 367. 
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Yet, the most marginalized often prove the most reluctant to give up on law as a site of social 
change.  Critical Race Scholars (CRS), including feminists within their ranks, helped lead the 
way back to law and legal strategies for social change.  The CLS and larger skepticism towards 
law failed, according to CRS, to take suffering seriously and failed also to recognize the ability 
of those who suffer to maintain a “dual consciousness” which accommodates “both the idea of 
legal indeterminacy as well as the core belief in a liberating law that transcends indeterminacy.” 
35
 “Rights-talk” allows marginalized peoples to speak the language of the powerful.  It therefore 
has the potential to force those who hold positions of power to live up to their professed 
commitments to equality and dignity of the individual and creates a common language through 
which those who hold power can come to recognize diverse experiences and needs.  As Carol 
Smart has put it, 
 
The person seeking her rights is not a supplicant or a seeker of charity, but a person with 




Moreover, law is no more susceptible to co-optation than other tools or strategies.
37
 
Ultimately, feminists have no choice but to engage with law: it is everywhere - international, 
regional, national and local.  It is used by those in power to justify violations against women and 
shapes our understandings of ourselves and our relationships with others.  As Celina Romany 
reminds us, “rights are defined by those who talk about them.”
38
  Law has played an important 
though difficult to document role in shaping public policy debates and one cannot separate legal 
strategies from political ones.
39
  Law also defines the expectations and regulates conduct of 
people in relation to each other.  For example, a case study of women and land in Uganda 
demonstrates how reformers were able to harness an ethos of justice to claim their rights in the 
community.  The language of rights proved not only useful in formal legal claims but also helped 




Recent feminist scholarship thus remains attentive to the barriers that women and other equality 
seekers face. Rather, than rejecting law, however, analysts and reformers seeks strategies to 
overcome the barriers.  They adopt a stance characterized by “constrained legalism, which 
strategically deploys law in a way that is neither utopian in its hopes for legal reform nor 
rejectionist in its dismissal of legal avenues of transformation.” 
41
 Some constrained legal 
strategies are discussed in the final sections of this paper.  Before such strategies can be 
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 Mari Matsuda, “Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations” (1987) 22 Harv. C.R. –C.L.L. 
Rev.323 at 341 
36
 Smart, supra note 28 at 152. 
37
 Orly Lobel, “The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics,” 
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fashioned, however, an understanding of the barriers facing women is necessary.  The next 
section of the paper discusses the considerations that must be brought to bear on such knowledge 
claims. 
4. Where – and Who - Are the Women? 
Feminist legal strategies begin with an understanding of women‟s lives as a pre-requisite to 
reading legal texts.  In other words, feminist approaches to law emphasize the need to understand 
women‟s needs before engaging the text.  Otherwise, law can be used to entrench rather than 
liberate women and important priorities for women can be overlooked simply because the legal 
texts – often not surprisingly – do not acknowledge them.  The Women’s Convention offers a 
good example.  The Convention does not explicitly prohibit violence against women although 
women around the globe suffer from violence that is perpetrated against them in both public and 
private spaces.  As they became educated about the incidence and dynamics of violence against 
women, CEDAW eventually held that the Women’s Convention must be understood as 
protecting women from violence – despite the absence of textual language to this effect – 
because the other rights encompassed within the treaty would be diluted if violence is ignored.
42
  
Consultation and commitment to understanding women‟s lived realities are therefore integral to 
defining a women‟s access to justice strategy.  Scholars and reformers highlight the importance 
of two key conceptual tools in shaping access to justice strategies that respond to women‟s needs 
and realities.   
 
An understanding of the different conceptions of equalities is the first tool needed to ensure that 
legal strategies are ultimately fashioned with women‟s experiences and needs in mind.  The 
essence of any campaign for women's rights rests on the demand, either implicitly or explicitly 
made, for equality.   It is often necessary to understand how different conceptions of equality can 
help make visible ways in which the law has failed to address women‟s needs.  The two main 
categories of equality are formal equality and substantive equality.   
 
Formal equality requires equality of treatment or the identical application of a rule between men 
and women.  Such a conception of equality, however, is limited because men's and women's 
needs often prove different in different contexts.
43
  Women, for example, might require 
accommodations in the workplace in the event that they become pregnant or have child care 
responsibilities.  Formal equality would not be violated if an employer refused maternity benefits 
to a woman provided that she is being treated the same as a man.  In such circumstances, 
substantive equality or equality of ends may prove more consistent with understanding women‟s 
needs and ultimately fashioning a campaign for women's rights than formal equality.  
Substantive equality might demand that women receive special protection because they are 
women and not simply in comparison to men.
44
   In some jurisdictions and contexts, substantive 
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equality has been promoted as the most conducive to women's rights and empowerment.
45
  In 
other contexts, however, women might consider substantive equality agendas problematic 
because they undercut their bid for parity and reinforce a "separate but equal" agenda which 
ultimately reinforces their social and economic marginalization. 
 
Intersectionality represents the second important conceptual tool that legal analysts and 
strategists must bring to bear on their quest to understand women‟s lived realities are part of 
fashioning an access to justice strategy.  One of the most pressing questions within women's 
rights literature is: in seeking to understand women‟s experiences, when and how does the 
category "women" obscure the differences among women thus silencing some women's suffering 
and/or privileging other women?  Women‟s experiences across the globe have demonstrated the 
importance of careful analysis of women‟s lived realities that are freed from essentializing 
assumptions about how law impacts upon women and what legal strategies should be fashioned 
to promote women‟s equality.   
 
Although the term "intersectionality" is not always explicitly used by women's rights scholars, 
the concept of intersectionality proves an important analytical tool for women's rights advocates 
across the globe. Intersectionality recognizes that women do not share the same experiences, 
agendas or interests and that they can be divided by other categories of identity such as class, 
race, sexuality and geography.
46
  For example, critics have argued that when UN bodies lobby 
governments to ensure that women have access to individual land title, they fail to account for 
indigenous women‟s experiences.
47
  Others point out that international norms governing work 





Questions of intersectionality arise in different ways but have persisted across the women's rights 
agenda.
49
  Legal advocates have pointed to the various sites of intersectionality in law and have 
emphasized how the concept can lead to be a better understanding of various women‟s needs and 
thus a better informed access to justice strategy.   First, intersectionality analysis can reveal the 
way in which legal norms impact upon different women differently.   Critics often observe that 
law focuses on the problems and promotes the interests of elite women over marginalized 
women.  One can point to examples of such claims in virtually every jurisdiction around the 
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  In Canada for example, the vast majority of the case law involving the equitable 
breakdown of property after divorce has been generated by women whose families hold some 
assets.  The law does not concern itself by and large with the distribution of debt. Yet, women 
find themselves burdened by debt – the significant number of family law reported decisions thus 
do not concern or help them because the law does not recognize their realities or speak to their 
problems.  Consider too the Arab Charter for Human Rights.  The Charter does not clearly 
extend basic protections to foreign domestic workers who tend to be women and national laws 
tend to exempt these workers from protection although their work conditions are often unsafe 
and unstable.
51
   
 
Second, different jurisdictions have different cost and cost rules; however most require some 
form of payment to lawyers and/or courts in the form of disbursements and advances which deter 
women from seeking out solutions to their problems using the formal legal system.  Related rules 
(such as the two way cost rule which prevails in diverse jurisdictions dictates that the losing 
party pays the costs of the winning party) also act as significant deterrence for women who lack 
financial resources.  In some jurisdictions, legal aid clinics focused on women‟s needs help fill 
the gap.
52
  Third, factors like geographic location and the language of service of legal institutions 
can impact upon women‟s access to justice in different ways.   Accessing state administrative 
agencies, courts and/or legal clinics can be difficult for those who live outside of urban centers.  
Language can pose a similar barrier for some women.   And, cultural and class norms within the 
legal system can work against some women.  Women from different cultures and classes can be 
loathe to use the mainstream legal system in part because they question the ability of the system 
to understand their needs or to deal fairly with them or their family members who might be 
implicated by the woman‟s claim
53
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Moreover, legal victories for some women do not necessarily amount to legal victories for other 
women.
54
 My research did not uncover any significant studies that specifically use empirical or 
comparative methods to determine to what extent some women might benefit from the law while 
others do not because of intersecting identities.
 
Nonetheless, individual cases highlight that 
women benefit differently from law and reinforces that their needs cannot be essentialized.  The 
experiences and needs of women living in poverty, for example, are different (and not simply 
more intense) than women who do not suffer poverty. The debate around divorce laws in Egypt 
is also illustrative, with some claiming that the no-fault divorce regime introduced by the new 
laws simply favours wealthy women who can afford to give up financial entitlements in favour 
of divorce.
55
    
 
In what sense then is "gender" a helpful analytical tool?  Sometimes, it can be important to 
abstract across women‟s differences and reinforce the commonality of women‟s experiences.  
The need for commonality comes up most forcefully in the FGM (Female Genital Mutilation - 
the term itself is a hotly contested) debate with some advocates denouncing the practice while 
others denouncing the campaign against FGM itself as "western"
56
 or worry that it is 
disconnected from a larger global patterns of violence against women thereby perpetrating an 
unhelpful image of the African woman as victim.
57
   
 
Nonetheless, intersectionality analysis warns against essentializing women‟s experiences and 
points to the need understand through research and analysis how dissecting identities transform 
women‟s experiences as part and parcel of thinking through the most effective access to justice 
strategy in any particular case or as part of an overall strategy of advocating for law reform in 
any given context.  There is no “one size fits all” solution; instead, advocates for reform must be 
aware of the range of conceptual tools that can be brought to bear on women‟s human rights 
advocacy.  A case by case approach to understanding how different legal priorities and strategies 
impact upon different women is required throughout the access to justice process.  The main 
questions are: who gets to decide what is an important issue for women, under what 
circumstances and using which criteria?  These questions prove especially acute in conflict and 
post-conflict societies where critics charge that reform and development priorities are not 
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necessarily defined through transparent political processes or by those who have a "stake in the 
system" but instead are set by those who are motivated by individual or external interests.
58
  
5. Texts and Contexts:  If Only the Texts Were the Main Barriers to Equality 
Generally speaking, there are few jurisdictions where there are no substantive norms or 
interpretive strategies that cannot –strictly as an interpretive matter- be harnessed in favour of 
women‟s equality, once the specific end goal of law reform is defined.  Language is law‟s 
medium and since language is open-textured, it has within it the possibility of re-interpretation.  
Moreover, every jurisdiction has its own interpretive practices or conventions which allow 
decision-makers and users of the law to decide between various possible interpretations.  There 
will thus likely always be, again as a strict matter of interpretation, a legal argument that is 
consistent with equality based on some combination of local, regional or international norms and 
the conventions of interpretation and normative values which decision-makers invoke to 
prioritize the various norms at their disposal.   
 
Of course all jurisdictions boast multiple legal norms which often conflict; some are rights-
enhancing for women while others prove rights-detracting.  The sites of conflict between local 
laws such as customary laws, national law, regional and international norms can take on various 
forms and exist for many reasons.  In some cases, local or customary laws are allowed to exist by 
governments that seek to politically appease or appeal to certain groups (the personal status laws 
in various Asian jurisdictions serve as an example).  In other cases, national laws such as 
constitutional guarantees of gender equality might conflict with international laws.  In still other 
cases, regional strategies and laws might conflict.  The quest for reproductive rights in South 
America, for example, might lead to an emphasis on women's rights to control her body.  This in 




How can apparent contradictions be resolved in favour of respecting women‟s rights?  Several 
interpretive strategies might be adopted depending on the circumstance.  First, it is important to 
bear in mind the difference between formal and substantive equality approaches and the need to 
always assess laws and policies against their particular social context to determine if the laws or 
policies ameliorate or perpetuate patterns of discrimination.  For example, in the case of the 
women‟s right to control her body in South America, this right represents a response to a pattern 
of discrimination against women.  The same right in India, however, can be claimed and 
articulated in a way which perpetuates gender discrimination as the sex selection example 
illustrates.  Ultimately, the goal is not to mechanically apply rights claims in any given context 
but to carefully and deliberately assess the impact of a rights claim on ameliorating specific 
injustices and patterns of discrimination. 
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Second, it is possible to use careful and detailed legal analysis to read away any perceived 
conflict thereby demonstrating that the laws which appear or have hitherto been interpreted as 
rights-detracting have been misunderstood.  Asma Barlas, for example, has sought to 
demonstrate that Islamic Shar‟ia proves consistent with women‟s equality and self-determination 
claims. 
60
 The second approach adopts the position that the discriminatory laws must be judged 
by and ultimately give way to higher set of values, norms or principles such as might be 
contained in national constitutions or basic laws or as might be articulated in international or 
regional human rights instruments.
61
  Arab countries, for example, have constitutions which can 
be interpreted progressively in favour of women‟s equality.  And, although countries tend to file 
reservations when they ratify international human rights treaties such as the Women‟s 
Conventions, these reservations must themselves be interpreted in a way that does not defeat the 
object or purpose of the treaty itself, namely women‟s dignity and equality. 
  
Regardless of the interpretive strategies invoked, there is no substitute for careful and creative 
legal argumentation by experienced and dedicated human rights oriented lawyers who 
understand the various tools and sources that can be marshalled in the name of equality.  But, of 
course, it is axiomatic that the text itself is not determinative or dispositive of women‟s lives or 
law‟s influence. Ultimately, as women‟s experiences across the globe have demonstrated, 
fashioning a good textual argument is not the most difficult part of the legal strategy, the most 
difficult part involves the interpretive context in which the text is read and understood.   
Consequently, women‟s needs are misrepresented and their rights ignored.  The world is fraught 
with examples.  Of particular note is the secondary status that social and economic rights have in 
relation to civil and political rights within both national and international laws.
62
  Given the 
feminization of poverty around the world, the priority of civil and political rights over social and 
economic ones within the larger human rights system represents an issue of pressing concern for 
women and women's rights advocates. Yet, the general reluctance of international bodies to 
interfere with the market mechanisms of a given state coupled with the low priority given to 
women‟s experiences as opposed to men‟s needs within the international system have served to 
entrench the lower hierarchy attached to social and economic rights. 
 
Much depends on how the actors within the legal system regard themselves and envision their 
roles. In some jurisdictions, for example, judges regard themselves as defenders of human 
dignity and are willing to use techniques such as purposive interpretation to advance human 
rights.  In other jurisdictions, judges regard themselves as "neutral" enforcers of the laws on the 
books and decry "judicial activism." 
63
 While it is unlikely that a single conception rules out the 
other in any given jurisdiction, it is important to understand whether there is a dominant trend or 
understanding of "rule of law" within the judiciary for the purposes of assessing both the efficacy 
of pursuing change through the courts and/or defining a particular litigation strategy and 
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orientation.  The following example involving South African Judge Albie Sachs proves 
instructive. 
 
At first sight, he had intended to throw out an appeal on behalf of Mrs M, who was facing 
four years in jail for up to 40 counts of credit card fraud that she had committed while 
under a suspended sentence for similar offences. "I remember drafting an extremely 
dismissive response. I said: 'This doesn't raise a constitutional question. She simply wants 
to avoid going to jail. She doesn't make out a case, and her prospects of success are zero.' " 
It was a female colleague, another of the 11 green-robed judges in South Africa's 
constitutional court, who insisted that the case be heard. She argued that the human rights 
of the accused woman's children were not being looked at separately. 
She said: 'There is something you are missing. What about the children? Mrs M has three 
teenage children. She lives in an area that we politely call fragile, an area of gangs, drug-
peddling and a fair amount of violence. The indications are that she is a good mother, and 
the magistrate gave no attention to the children's interests.' 
The minute my colleague spoke to me about the importance of the three teenage children 
of Mrs M, I started to see them not as three small citizens who had the right to grow up into 
big citizens but as three threatened, worrying, precarious, conflicted young boys who had a 
claim on the court, a claim on our society as individuals, as children, and a claim not to be 




As Justice Sachs‟ story of judgment illustrates, oppression is often not about the need for new 
laws but about the willingness of those who hold power to use their power for the sake of the 
oppressed, including women.
65
   
 
In most jurisdictions, women have substantial legal protections; however, their rights are not 
fully respected or implemented. For example, the right to health in sub-Saharan Africa is a 
recognized right but women with HIV-AIDS are often ignored by governments in defining 
policies and programs that advance the right to health.
66
 Similarly, factors such as delay, 
corruption, deeply engrained local attitudes and questionable reliance on customary and religious 
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norms limit women‟s rights in Bangladesh.
67
  Rights enforcement involves overcoming a host of 
substantive, procedural and social hurdles to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality.  The 
substantive hurdles can include factors such as the insistence that particular interpretations of 
Islamic Shar‟ia trump rights recognized in national and international human rights instruments. 
Procedural hurdles include the high cost of getting before a decision-maker who might reinforce 
a given right while social hurdles include such things as the propensity of police and other state 
agents to consider violations of women‟s rights as matters falling within the private sphere and 
therefore not the proper subject of state interference as well as social stigmas against women 
invoking rights-talk.
68
   
 
Judges and other legal actors are members of their societies and we cannot expect them to make 
decisions in a vacuum.  They appeal to the norms of their societies to both consider and 
emphasize the legitimacy of their own decision-making.  This fact coupled with the recognition 
that women‟s different needs suggest the importance of “de-centering” law
69
 and assessing how 
other non-legal strategies (such as sit-ins or public education) might be necessary to transform a 
given situation or scenario.  In any given context, the trade-offs as well as the possible synergies 
that can be created between legal and non-legal strategies must be assessed.
70
 The next section of 
this paper identifies the various strategies that can be invoked.   
6. “Constrained Legalism:” Combining the Legal and Extra-Legal  
As the paper has stressed, legal strategies often cannot be successful on their own but must be 
buttressed with various non-legal strategies and supports.  The particular combination of legal 
and extra-legal strategy that is invoked depends on the context. The following examples are 
intended to illustrate alternative ways in which law can be invoked and women‟s access to 
justice promoted by weaving non-legal strategies and supports into access to justice.
71
   
 
Recognizing that the very barriers that perpetuate women‟s social and economic inequality also 
keep them from accessing their legal rights, various legal clinics and advocates around the world 
have moved from simply providing direct legal representation to ensuring counseling and health 
care for clients and pursuing lobbying and educational efforts with legal decision-makers such as 
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  Moreover, women have sought procedural alternatives to individual 
litigation.  Where social norms or geography limit access to formal legal mechanisms such as 
courts, marginalized women might pursue informal justice mechanisms (sometimes referred to as 
"tribunal justice" or "alternative dispute resolution.")
73
 In other contexts, public interest litigation 
and/or class action litigation have proven effective for women‟s advocacy where such forms of 
access to courts exist.
74
   
 
Where women have sought to pursue litigation through the courts, they have also turned to extra-
legal strategies in support of their litigation efforts and vice-versa.  In such cases, women invoke 
either implicitly or explicitly their legal rights but claim those rights in the informal public space 
rather through or sometimes in addition to pursuing formal mechanisms such as courts.   The 
campaign by Fawiez Al-Kurd against her family‟s forced eviction by Israeli authorities in 
Jerusalem represents such an example.  The matriarch set up a tent near the site of her 
demolished family home and refused to leave because she wanted justice.
75
  Of course the 
effectiveness of such public appeal or education strategies depends in large part on the values of 
the public to which one is appealing.   The final message is that the development of legal 
strategies requires broad consultation to determine which legal issues are most important for 
which groups of women to ensure the maximum impact of resource allocation, an understanding 
of the goals that the women would like to achieve, an analysis of which strategies best fit those 
goals along with an assessment of the resources needed for implementation, enforcement and 
measurement of ultimate impacts. 
 
Lawyers and legal scholars have partnered with civil society organizations including human 
rights NGOs, universities and the media to create coordinating strategies that are both legal and 
extra-legal.
 76
  These include: offering an alternative philosophy and interpretation of norms that 
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 generating public debate over a particular injustice concerning women's 
democratic participation and violations of women's rights thus creating understanding of the 
need for broader systemic reforms;
78
   bringing forward cases in local, national, regional or 
internal fora in ways that pay attention to local needs and limitations;
79
 coordinating political 
advocacy to consolidate systemic changes; 
80
 generating deeper understanding and awareness of 
women's rights issues by policy-makers and others through studies and analysis; and appealing to 
broad based social norms to generate public support for change.   
 
Regardless of the approach taken, strategies and action must be developed by those who have 
knowledge of the social context in which law is operating.  This requires legal experts and 
change agents to work with civil society organizations to understand both women‟s realities and 
the relationships that sustain the status quo.  The following paragraphs identify specific ways in 
which civil society organizations and women who hold positions of power can help promote 
women‟s rights more broadly.  They are intended as examples of isolated moves that might be 
made by those who seek to change the status quo.  The various moves can be woven into a more 
comprehensive strategy that can be developed and devised through a tactical mapping exercise 
which offers a more strategic approach to the promotion of justice and access to justice. Tactical 
mapping
81
 engages lawyers, civil society organizations and those who hold positions of power in 
a network designed to coordinate knowledge and relationships in a process of systemic change 
through the invocation of a range of context specific initiatives.  
 
Tactical mapping focuses on relationships.  Human rights abuses are sustained by a complex 
system of relationships that mutually reinforce the role of the abuser.  Some of these 
relationships are hierarchical or otherwise structural; others are informal.  Each of these 
relationships is a potential site of intervention that would respond to a different tactic.    
 
Tactical mapping thus begins by identifying the relationships that sustain rights abuses, identifies 
the range of possible tactics that might be deployed within this relational web, catalogues the 
change tactics currently being engaged, identifies which actors are affected by these tactics, 
identifies the individuals and institutions that remain unaffected and determines what tactics can 
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reasonably be deployed and which allies can be meaningfully engaged.  Tactical mapping 
understands that law has an important but not exclusive role to play in social change. 
Implementation of tactical mapping strategies require that various organizations and individuals 
“develop the capacity to collaborate on an overall strategy aimed at disrupting the system of 
relationships embedded in human rights abuses.”
82
  Collaboration is essential because most 
organizations can only adopt and implement one or two tactics given resource and knowledge 
limits.  But, the status quo generally does not yield to a single tactic. Multiple strategies are 
needed.  The following paragraphs identify isolated, though complex, strategies that have been 
successfully deployed, to varying degrees, by various individuals and organizations to effect 
change.  They are intended to be illustrative only and can be rolled into a larger tactical mapping 
strategy.   
 
By undertaking policy-oriented and fact based research, civil society organizations can reveal 
gender discrimination and demonstrate where individual experiences reflect systemic biases, 
inequalities and power structures.
83
  They can, moreover, provide critical analysis of prevailing 
legal strategies that appear progressive but which have the unintended effect of privileging some 
women‟s claims at the expense of others.  Studies of cases in South Africa, for example, reveal 
that women can achieve victories in court where the legal strategy advances an image of them as 
“good mothers.” “When advocating or litigating for gender justice, often practical interests of 
women‟s needs (arguing a case in terms of women‟s stereotypical roles) takes precedence over 
strategic arguments such as how to shift and change society and its valuation of women and men 
over the long term.”
84
  Women‟s rights scholars and reformers have joined forces to educate 
themselves and brainstorm new equality enhancing approaches. 
 
Civil society organizations can also work to generate statutory reform.  In Fiji, for example, 
women were able to advance a new Family Law Act by helping to mobilize both the community 
and advocates within the political system in favour of such reforms.
85
 Civil society organizations 
have also played an important role in educating decision-makers within the legal system. In 
South Asia, for example, NGOs were able to contribute to judicial understandings of inequality 
and help judges come to grips with their own stereotypes and the myths they brought to decision-
making concerning violence against women.
 86
  In other jurisdictions, they have supported cause 
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 and public interest litigation and have helped bridge the divide between elitist legal 
strategies and broad based social movements which adopt a more participatory approach to 
social change.
88
 It should be noted, however, that legal advocates and/or civil society 
organizations - even those with a women's rights agenda - can themselves perpetuate and 
entrench inequality.  For example, the organizations might not be sufficiently in tune with 





Alliances with women who hold political or economic power can also generate some legal gains 
for women equality-seekers.  It goes without saying that placing women in positions of authority 
does not in and of itself advance democratic governance and the rule of law.  Indeed, women can 
be members of social, political and economic elites and can perpetuate the exclusion from and 
oppression by law of marginalized women.
90
  Women who enter the halls of power face what has 
been termed "the double bind," even if they are inclined towards advancing women's equality.  
On the one hand, they must conform to the values and principles of their home institution and its 
culture if they purport to be heard within that culture.  On the other hand, they must seek to 
change the culture in ways which might ultimately undo the institution and perhaps render them 
ineffective as individuals.  And, of course, women do not always advance the rights of other 
women simply because they share the same gender.  That being said, powerful though not 
always comfortable alliances have formed between women in decision-making positions, 
feminist researchers, women's organizations and policy-makers to advance democratic 
governance and the rule of law.  A good example might be the development of legal norms in the 
Tribunal set up to try war crimes in Rwanda.   
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Prosecutor Louise Arbour worked closely with women's rights organizations and feminist 
lawyers/researchers to help shape the law.
91
 On May 27, 1997, a coalition of women‟s 
organizations filed an amicus curiae brief in the case against Jean-Paul Akayesu, requesting an 
amendment of the indictment and supplementation of the evidence to ensure the prosecution of 
rape and other sexual violence. On June 17, 1997, Arbour amended the indictment against Jean-
Paul Akayesu to include charges of rape and inhuman treatment.  On October 2, 1998, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda sentenced former mayor Jean-Paul Akayesu to three 
life sentences for genocide and crimes against humanity and to 80 years for other violations 
including rape and encouraging widespread sexual violence.  The groundbreaking decision 




Some scholars have pointed to the development of “demosprudence” which seeks to build 
collaborative relations between formal elites such as judges and legislators with “ordinary 
people.”  Demosprudence “emphasizes the role of informal democratic mobilizations and wide-
ranging social movements that serve to make formal institutions, including those that regulate 
legal culture, more democratic.”
93
  It builds on the idea that judges and other legal decision-
makers can gain a source of democratic authority by appealing to and engaging those whom their 
decisions affect.  Demosprudence can be exercised through a myriad of techniques, including the 
manner in which a legal decision is written and addressed.  Judges who write demosprudentially 
write for society at large and not simply their colleagues or the litigants before them.  They 





Access to justice for women must be “informed by a critical appreciation of law’s limits that 
seeks to exploit law’s opportunities to advance transformative goals.”
95
  Law can offer a medium 
to confront the injustices and unfairness built into other systems of political, social and economic 
ordering. Women‟s rights advocates have won significant victories through law and have 
generated gains for women‟s dignity and equality.  However, law can also be a place where 
women‟s rights are not only silenced but where social, economic and political power structures 
are replicated and work against women‟s rights. Rule of law programming focused on women‟s 
rights and democratic governance must therefore begin with an understanding of the limits of 
law and the barriers to invoking law as a tool of social change.  Access to justice strategies can 
only be fashioned when these barriers are properly understood.  The main barrier to women‟s 
equality is not the law, understood narrowly as legal texts because all laws can be interpreted 
progressively when read against norms from national, regional or international sources.  The 
challenge is to convince decision-makers to use their power in favour of women‟s rights.  Often, 
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addressing this challenge requires not only legal arguments but extra-legal campaigns such as 
public education, political lobbying and/or judicial education.  Such strategies must be coupled 
with a clear understanding of how law impacts upon and influences women‟s lives as a pre-
requisite to not only fashioning effective legal arguments but also putting into place the supports 
that women often need before they can enter into the legal arena.  
8. Critical Areas for Future Research 
This paper has noted in a number of places where debates rather than answers dominate the 
discussion about women‟s democratic rights and the rule of law.  Any of the issues identified and 
discussed above can certainly form the subject of sustained analysis in a given region and/or 
internationally.  The following section summarizes the key themes that run through the paper 
and/or identify the more pressing areas for future research: 
 
 Develop Tactical Mapping strategies focused on key violations against women in specific 
geographic areas as a model for how to undertake such an exercise in the context of 
women‟s democratic development and human rights.  
  
 Mapping Rule of Law programming in key geographic areas with an eye to determining 
how the rule of law is defined, whose interests are promoted through the particular 
conception of the rule of law advanced, which interests and voices are silenced through 
such programming, how rule of law programming has impacted upon marginalized 
groups, whether rule of law programming has limited other approaches to women‟s 




 Case studies that examine the relationship between legal reform and social change. Such 
studies would involve empirical, longitudinal research into social change that starts with 
a clear understanding of law and legal systems as well as relevant sociological literature 
pertaining to social movements and mechanisms for measuring social change. 
 
 Case studies that examine how law is used both in formal legal systems and to structure 
and organize social relations in a way that has had positive impacts upon women, as well 
as case studies that illustrate how legal claims have backfired on the rights claimants as 
both a formal legal claim and a social construct. 
 
 Case studies to evaluate to what extent international institutions, select rule of law NGOs 
and/or legal advocacy strategies employ intersectionality and substantive equality 
analysis in defining and appealing to their constituents and/or shaping legal strategies.  
How does intersectionality and substantive equality factor into assessments of rule of law 
strategies and programming? 
 
 Case studies to examine the extent women have been able to navigate various legal 
systems (local, customary, national and international) to advance their rights and what 
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strategies have proven effective in select contexts.  How have secularism and religious 
norms interacted in a given context?  Legal scholars are increasingly advocating legal 
pluralism as a way of accommodating competing social and legal claims.  What are the 
underlying assumptions of legal pluralism and how does it work to either advance or 
hinder women‟s rights claims? 
 
It should be noted that the case studies would ideally be accompanied by conceptual analysis that 
is rooted in an understanding of law and legal mechanisms across jurisdictions. 
 
 
